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Abstract 
Paper provides a digest of the material covered in a Seminar on Informal Finance 
in Development held in Washington, D.C. in October 1989. This includes a summary 
of the major new findings about the informal finance reported in the Seminar, a 
suggested agenda for new research on this topic, and a list of policy suggestions raised 
in the meetings. 
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INFORMAL FINANCE IN WW INCOME COUNTRIES: 
A SEMINAR REPORT 
by 
Dale W Adams 
BACKGROUND 
Since World War II governments in low income countries, assisted by external 
donor and nongovernmental agencies, have promoted thousands of credit programs for 
poor people. These programs make up the bulk of poverty alleviation efforts in many 
countries. While a few of these endeavors have evolved into sustainable and efficient 
operations, many more of them were transitory and provided financial services to only 
a relatively small number of poor people. Most of these projects have been marked by 
low loan recovery rates, high transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers, insolvent 
lending institutions, corruption, loans going to individuals who were not poor, and 
dependence on external funding. 1 Since the early 1970s many of the reasons for the 
problems in these credit programs have been understood and they were aired extensively 
in the "Colloquium on Rural Finance in Low Income Countries" held in Washington 
D.C., September, 1981.2 
In reaction to the disappointing results from traditional credit programs for the 
poor, the Agency for International Development (AID) issued a policy paper on financial 
sector development in 1988 that outlined new guidelines for preparing finance projects 
more in tune with the recommendations made in the 1981 Colloquium.3 While some 
1The first general recognition of these problems surfaced the in "Spring Review of 
Small Farmer Credit Programs" carried out by E. B. Rice for the Agency for Inter-
national Development in 1972-73. For more details on this Review see Gordon Donald, 
Credit for Small Farmers in Developin2 Countries, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1976, and the twenty volumes of papers and studies prepared for the Review. 
2The Colloquium was sponsored by the Ohio State University, The Agency for 
International Development, and the World Bank. A summary of the main points made 
in the Colloquium can be found in Dale W Adams and others, Underminin~ Rural 
Development With Cheap Credit, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
3 Agency for International Development, Bureau for Program and Policy Coord-
ination, "AI.D. Policy Paper: Financial Marke~ Development," Agency for International 
Development, Washington D. C., 1988. Four main elements were included in the 
recommended guidelines: placing more emphasis on the vitality of the financial system 
itself, setting interest rates that accurately reflect market conditions, more emphasis on 
deposit mobilization, and placing more attention on reducing transaction costs in financial 
1 
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headway has been made by AID and other donor agencies in encouraging policy changes 
that facilitate successful finance projects, the progress to date in providing sustainable, 
formal finance for the poor--both loan and deposit services--has been modest. It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that, even when conducive policies are in place, it is still 
arduous and costly to provide formal financial services to many of the poor, especially 
individuals livjng in rural areas. 
If attention is limited to the difficulties of providing formal financial services to 
the poor, it is easy to conclude that poverty and sustainable financial services are 
incompatible. This conclusion has led many policy makers to anticipate and tolerate 
meager performance from credit programs for poor people. The picture is less bleak if 
the focus of attention is expanded to include informal financial activities. 4 Recent 
research is showing that poor people extensively use informal finance and that these 
arrangements are often sustained over long periods of time. 5 
It is puzzling why informal finance flourishes in the shadows of floundering formal 
financial systems. A rural bank in the Philippines, for example, may hold a portfolio 
made up largely of overdue loans, while a merchant in the same village recovers virtually 
all of the loans she makes. The Agricultural Bank in Bolivia may attract few deposits 
while many of its own employees are depositing relatively large amounts of funds in 
informal savings groups. Also, commercial banks in India may find it impossible to 
provide small loans to poor individuals wishing to buy old vehicles, while informal finance 
companies conduct a thriving business lending to these clients (Nayar). Similarly, 
itinerant merchants in Indonesia may make a living selling items door-to-door in rural 
areas on credit and then collecting payments daily, while formal banks cannot afford to 
provide these services, even if loans are much larger and borrowers trudge to banks or 
cooperatives to effect all transactions. 
THE SEMINAR 
Trying to explain why informal finance succeeds with the poor, while formal 
finance often fails, was the focus of a seminar on informal finance in low income 
countries held in Rosslyn, Virginia on October 18-20, 1989. It was sponsored by The 
Ohio State University, the Bureaus for Science & Technology and Africa of the Agency 
markets. 
4lnformal finance is defined as those loan and deposit activities that are unregulated 
by a central monetary authority. 
5For further details on these studies see: Agricultural Finance Program, "Annotated 
Bibliography on Agricultural Credit and Rural Savings: XIII (A Special Issue on Informal 
Finance)." Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State 
University, Columbus, Ohio, October, 1989. 
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for International Development, and the Economic Development Institute and the 
Agricultural Policies Division of the World Bank. Approximately 150 people attended 
the seminar and most of them were employees of development agencies, researchers, or 
students studying development. A total of 36 presentation were made including 24 
papers, 10 paper discussants, two discussions of past and future research on informal 
finance, and a panel discussion on the significance of informal finance for donor agencies 
(See Appendix A for more details on the Seminar Program). 
The seminar had four objectives: First, to bring together a representative group 
of individuals doing research on informal finance around the world and to allow them 
to report on their findings. Second, to develop an informal network of individuals who 
are interested in doing further research in this area. Third, to solicit suggestions from 
donor employees on the types of research that ought to be done on this topic. And 
fourth, to design a revised research agenda that might provide information useful in 
designing finance programs for poor people in low income countries. 
MAJOR SEMINAR CONCLUSIONS 
Challenged Traditional Stereotypes 
Much of the traditional thinking about informal finance emphasizes negative 
aspects: usury, monopoly profits, labor bonding through lending, and loan defaults leading 
to collateral seizure by lenders. Most of this thinking has been stereotypical and 
concentrated on the supposedly evil moneylender who takes advantage of poor people. 
It has also been commonly thought that informal finance should be eliminated--at least 
tightly controlled--and that overall formal financial development would cause these 
activities to wither away. 
Traditional thinking about informal finance was challenged by presentations in 
the seminar. Participants reported finding a kaleidoscope of heterogeneous informal 
financial arrangements in their research, only a small portion of which was done by full-
time professional money lenders. Likewise, there was almost no verbal flogging of 
informal lenders in the Seminar. Most of the discussion concentrated on the positive 
aspects of informal finance, how it contributes to the well being of the poor, how it 
supports development, and useful lessons that can be learned from it. While informal 
sources provide most of the financial services for poor people--particularly for women--
several Seminar participants pointed out that many relatively large firms and well-off 
people also regularly use informal finance. In some cases, relatively poor individuals or 
firms may be providing loans to individuals or firms that are relatively well off. Virtually 
anyone can be an informal lender or borrower. 
Several presentations in the Seminar (Onchan, Sanderatne) showed that the 
relative importance of informal loans has declined the past several decades, but went on 
to stress that this is largely due to rapid growth in formal lending. It was suggested that 
informal finance normally expands in absolute terms with the growth of formal finance 
and the economy in general, and that informal sources usually continue to provide most 
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financial services to the poor, regardless of growth in formal finance. Several participants 
also reported on cases where recent retractions in formal financial markets resulted in 
an increase in the relative importance of informal finance (Lamberte, Sanderatne, 
Schrieder and Cuevas). The absolute expansion in these activities was partly explained 
by the rapid growth in the informal sector in many countries (de Soto) and partly by the 
advantages it has in providing certain services (Bouman and Bastiaanssen). 
Importance of Informal Savin2s 
Most of the traditional discussions of informal finance stress only debts or loans. 
Because it is often assumed poor people cannot or will not save and that most of them 
have a "credit need" that translates into a social entitlement, there is relatively little 
discussion of informal deposits. The difficulties of collecting information about confi-
dential saving behavior reinforces this assumption and influences the terminology used 
to describe activities in informal finance: e.g., 'informal credit markets,' 'rotating credit 
associations,' and 'credit groups.' 
In contrast, extensive discussion in the Seminar reported on sizeable deposit and 
savings activities taking place in informal financial markets. Many of the participants 
were optimistic about the willingness and ability of even poor people to save in low 
income countries. A number of participants also argued that savings-deposits were an 
important element in development of sustainable financial intermediation. In a fun-
damental sense, large amounts of informal loans are the mirror image of part of the 
informal savings that emerge in financial form. Someone postpones consumption--saves-
-in order to accumulate every unit of money lent in informal markets. 
A number of the papers presented in the Seminar focused on various aspects of 
informal savings and deposits (Chimedza, DeLancey, Fernando, Graham, Izumida, 
Schrieder and Cuevas, Shipton, and Von Pischke) These presentations showed that 
large amounts of deposits are mobilized through various forms of informal groups, and 
that savings are a major motivation for people to participate in groups. In some cases 
the volume of informal financial savings flowing through informal markets may be as 
large or larger than the volume of deposits in banks (Cameroon). The large volume of 
voluntary savings moving through informal markets also suggests that formal financial 
markets often fail to offer attractive deposit services, especially to poor people. The 
widespread use of moneyguards as a place to deposit interest-free funds is a vivid 
indication of this failure (Graham, Shipton). 
The gender issue is particularly important in informal savings. Many of the 
individuals who are involved in informal savings activities are women (Chimedza, 
DeLancey, Otero and Downing). This shows that women have relatively high savings 
propensities and also experience more difficulty in accessing formal financial services 
than do men. 
Stren~ths of Informal Finance 
Virtually all of the presentations in the Seminar mentioned strengths or advantages 





low information costs for the lender, and high loan recovery rates. Other advantages 
mentioned are less well known. For example, several presentations focused on how 
informal lenders resolve the difficult and sometimes costly loan collateral problems 
(Bouman and Bastiaanssen, Esguerra and Meyer, and Onchan). In some cases the 
ancient practice of pawning assets is used to reduce the costs of lenders securing loan 
guarantees. In other cases, informal lenders specialize in accepting certain types of 
collateral substitutes such as marketing agreements, labor arrangements, or some form 
of reciprocity. 
Another important advantage is that many forms of informal finance provide 
services at the residence of the client, at a convenient market place, or where clients 
work (Fernando, Hospes, and Prabowo). Most informal finance is client oriented, while 
formal intermediaries are often more concerned about their regulators: central banks, 
government officials, and donor agencies. Intermediaries. with a client orientation 
substantially reduce the transaction costs for clients and make their service attractive 
even though explicit or implicit interest charges are relatively high. Lender-oriented 
intermediaries focus on keeping their transaction costs low, charge relatively low interest 
rates, but often impose procedures on borrowers and depositors that substantially increase 
their transaction costs to the point where total costs of effecting the financial transaction 
may be higher than if they were done in the informal market. 
Still another attractive feature of some types of informal finance, especially those 
involving groups, is that loans and deposits are often tied. Individuals can increase their 
access to loans or credit reserves by proving themselves through deposit performance. 
This includes building bonds of mutual trust that assure future access to loans through 
reciprocity. In many cases, informal finance allows participants to gradually enhance 
their creditworthiness, first through savings, then through borrowing and repaying small 
loans, and only later gaining access to relatively large loans (Liedholm). This process 
is particularly important for individuals and firms that start small: women, microenter-
prises, and poor people. 
The rich variety of types of informal finance and the fact that these activities can 
be found in virtually every nook and cranny of an economy demonstrates the innovative 
and dynamic nature of at least some parts of the informal financial system. It also 
demonstrates that informal finance is usually more resilient in the face of adversities 
that affect the overall economy than is generally true of formal finance, in part, because 
informal finance is unregulated. In some cases, a few forms of informal finance may 
exist to avoid regulation or taxes and provide services that are similar to those provided 
by regulated intermediaries (Vogel). 
Some discussion in the Seminar also outlined the inherent weaknesses of informal 
finance. It is more awkward for informal intermediaries to provide large and long-term 
loans than it is for formal lenders, and it is also more difficult for informal arrangements 
to provide the liquidity and security that formal intermediaries ought to be able to 
furnish to depositors. 
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RESEARCH PRIORffiES 
Much of the research on informal finance in low income countries describes types 
of informal finance, often through case studies. The bulk of this research has been done 
by anthropologists and sociologists. Lesser amounts of economic research have stressed 
documenting the relative importance of' informal finance, changes over time in its 
importance, interest rates charged in informal markets, and the extent of exploitation 
(Wai). A recent study of informal finance in five Asian Countries, sponsored by the 
Asian Development Bank, also probed the effects of informal finance on resource 
allocation, aggregate savings, and monetary management. 6 
Until recently, a major part of the analysis done on informal finance, especially 
by economists, had a negative tone; it mostly viewed informal finance as being 
undesirable. From a public relations standpoint, informal finance has an image problem 
(Ghate). The tone of Seminar presentations, however, was generally positive regarding 
virtually all forms of informal finance. Many of the participants argued that informal 
finance plays a vital and positive role in economic development, that it is indispensable 
in serving the poor, and that a good deal of useful information about the process of 
financial intermediation can be gleaned from objective analysis·· of it. 
At least six topics for additional research surfaced in the Seminar: ( 1) methodo-
logical problems, (2) looking for generalizations that cut across countries, (3) identifying 
desirable services provided by informal finance, ( 4) studying the practices and techniques 
used in informal finance to reduce transaction costs, (5) broadening the analysis of 
borrowing costs from just interest charges to include expenses associated with providing 
collateral, transaction costs, and quality of financial services, and (6) studying the 
interaction between formal and informal financial markets. 
Research methods problems. Because of heterogeneity, small transactions, legality 
questions, and dispersion of informal finance it is extremely costly to do the large surveys 
necessary to answer statistically significant questions about the relative importance of 
informal finance for an entire economy. Unless policy makers are skeptical about the 
importance of informal finance in their country, these massive studies probably do not 
yield information worth their costs (Graham). Does it really matter if informal finance 
provides 40 or 70 percent of the total value of loans in an economy, or whether poor 
people obtain 50 or 90 percent of their loans from informal sources? It may be 
sufficient to show that informal finance is important in a few representative industries 
and within groups that are of policy concern. A more important issue might be under-
standina how informal finance works and the services it provides. Studies of represent-
ative cases may be a less costly way of assembling this information than is doing surveys. 
At least initially, in many countries, research will have to address the concerns policy 
makers have about informal finance, no matter how unfounded they may seem (Ghate). 
6The study included Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, The Philippines, and Thailand. 
P.B. Ghate of the Economics Section in the Asian Development Bank coordinated the 
study. 
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A related practical problem is how to do a rapid dia~osis of informal finance in 
a country where little systematic analysis of this topic has been done before (Flammang). 
Many governments and most large donor agencies do periodic assessments of formal 
financial markets. If an assessment of informal finance becomes a regular part of these 
broader assessments, how can researchers contribute insights without doing large numbers 
of highly detailed case studies or costly surveys whose results may not be available for 
several years? Should these assessments have as their unit of analysis the type of 
informal finance (e.g., pawning), an industry (e.g., the textile industry), a target group 
(e,g., microenterprises), a geographic area (e.g., a central market), or some combinations 
of these units? 
Look for 2eneralizations. Descriptive studies are a critical first step in science 
and are indispensable in understanding phenomena as complex as informal finance. It 
would be possible, however, for the small number of researchers who are working on 
informal finance to spend all of their time only in describing and detailing the multitude 
of nuances found within a country and in various regions of the world in just rotating 
savings credit associations (ROSCAS). There is a seemingly endless and evolving variety 
of these savings and credit groups. While additional descriptive studies of interesting 
and innovative forms of informal finance are clearly useful, it would be even more useful 
if research on this topic increasingly focused on derivinK Keneralizations that hold across 
types of informal finance and countries. Research that uncovers generalization, in turn, 
would be more useful to policy makers than is purely descriptive research. 
Identifyin~ desirable services. Informal finance is popular and persists largely 
because it provides valuable services to its clients, the vast majority of whom are acting 
voluntarily. A clearer understanding of the nature and desirability of these services 
would allow policy makers to design formal finance projects that provide at least some 
of these services, thereby making formal finance more attractive to individuals and firms 
currently using informal finance. 
Practices and techniQ,Yes. Expense-reducing innovations, low transaction costs, 
and creative ways of handling loan guarantees are hallmarks of informal finance. In 
contrast, formal finance is often characterized by innovations that are directed at 
regulation avoidance, result in excessive transaction costs, and involve inflexible loan 
collateral requirements. These hallmarks of informal finance largely explain why it is 
successful in providing financial services to the poor, while markedly different character-
istics of the formal financial system help explain why poor people remain beyond its 
reach. Research on informal finance may uncover practices and techniques that could 
be grafted onto formal finance activities and also suggest policy changes that might allow 
formal intermediaries to expand the formal financial frontier to encompass more low-
income individuals and firms. 
Borrowin& costs. A good deal of the research on informal finance has been based 
on two important assumptions: interest payments were the main cost of borrowing, and 
a unit of financial service provided via informal finance was identical to a unit provided 
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by a formal intermediary. Discussion in the Seminar suggested both of these assumptions 
ought to be tested. 
Particularly for borrowers and depositors of small amounts, transaction costs may 
weigh more heavily in their decisions than do interest payments. Likewise, the costs of 
providing acceptable loan guarantees to the lender may influence borrowers more 
forcefully than do interest charges. 
Risk considerations should also be included in analyses of borrowing and 
depositing. For example, a borrower may accept a loan tied to a commodity sales 
agreement, even though the price paid on the commodity is relatively low, because the 
lender assumes the risks of changes in commodity prices. Likewise, depositors may 
prefer to leave their money, interest-free, with trusted moneyguards rather than in 
interest-bearing accounts at a government bank whose practices do not appear to be 
businesslike. 
Too many studies compare interest rates on informal loans with those levied on 
formal loans without carefully considering the differences in the services purchased. 
Occasional borrowers of small amounts, for example, may be willing to pay relatively 
high rates of interest on their loans from dependable informal lenders because doing so 
may assure them of future access to emergency loans--essentially a line of credit. 7 The 
relationship may also commit the lender to intercede for a borrower in vital matters 
such as minor legal and administrative hassles in a village. These same borrowers may 
ignore formal loans that carry lower interest rates because additional services are absent 
or because the formal lender is viewed as being transitory. Additional research on these 
important issues would clarify the subtle services in informal finance that enhance 
attractiveness and possibly provide important lessons for formal intermediaries. 
Interaction between informal and formal finance. Much of the traditional 
discussion of informal finance has depicted it as operating largely in isolation from 
informal finance, partly because of the extensive use of interest rate differentials to 
. measure market segmentation. This has led to some discussion of how to increase 
connections between formal and informal markets. Increasingly, however, research is 
showing that formal and informal finance are substantially connected, that economies of 
specialization explain some apparent market segmentation, and that many people use 
both formal and informal finance. Connections include users of formal loans who spend 
their borrowed funds in informal markets, group savings that are deposited in banks, and 
formal borrowers who make informal loans. 
The interactions between formal and informal finance go beyond simply the 
movement of funds. In some cases informal forms of finance evolve into formal forms 
(e.g., Cameroon, India, and Japan). In other cases severe repression of formal finance 
may result in banks converting some of their activities into informal arrangements. 
7Individuals who pay a membership fee for the right to carry a credit card that they 
seldom use, but want it nonetheless for emergencies, are doing the same thing. 
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There are also a number of cases where formal and semi-formal forms of finance--
ACCION, for example--have borrowed a number of ideas from informal finance 
(Christen). 
Additional research that clarifies the extent and desirability of interactions between 
formal and formal finance could be valuable to policy makers who are designing 
programs to enhance connections within financial markets. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
At least five policy strategies for dealing with informal finance were mentioned 
in the Seminar. 
Abolish. Re~late. or Reduce 
There was virtually no support among Seminar participants for the traditional 
view that informal finance should be closely regulated, reduced in scope, and even 
abolished. Most of the discussion focused on the positive contributions informal finance 
makes to development and the well being of the poor. Many of the participants were 
more in favor of trying to enhance the performance of informal finance, or at least learn 
from it, rather than trying to abolish it. 
Beni~ Ne&lect 
There was some support in the Seminar for essentially leaving informal finance 
alone. Under this strategy the main consideration is to avoid policies that would 
inadvertently and unfairly hinder informal finance, as intervention in financial markets 
has often done. 
Link Formal with Informal 
A number of Seminar participants, especially individuals representing donor and 
nongovernmental agencies, supported using informal finance as conduits for formal loans 
(Seibel and Parhusip ). They argued that augmenting the supply of funds available for 
informal lending may be the only efficient way to effectively lend to poor people. At 
the same time, there was skepticism expressed about this strategy (Flammang, Hospes ). 
Some attenders, especially those who were not economists and who were not directly 
associated with donor agencies, argued that infusions of external funds would undermine 
basic elements that cause success in informal finance. For example, outside funds may 
lessen the incentive for informal groups to save, increase transaction costs, introduce 
political decisions into lending, and lessen the incentives to repay loans. An unanswered 
question is, how much outside funds can be absorbed by informal lenders or groups 
before the elements that nurture their success are altered adversely? It is also unclear 
if formal loans targeted for poor people would be any less problematic than earlier 
formal loan programs that were targeted. 
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Convert Informal to Formal 
Some Seminar discussion revolved around the possibilities of helping informal 
groups evolve into semi-formal or formal finance (Seibel). Experimental programs 
sponsored by the West German's Gesellschaft fuer Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
in Cameroon and in Indonesia are providing valuable insights into the possibilities of 
assisting this evolution. It will be useful for researchers to monitor these efforts over the 
next few years in order to carefully document results. 
Emulate Informal Finance 
A final strategy involves learning from informal finance but not attempting to 
alter its activities through outside interventions. This would largely involve doing 
research on informal finance to clarify the types of services it provides and the tech-
niques and practices used to provide financial services to the poor. This should include 
analyses of informal financial activities as part of financial sector assessments as well as 
more specific analysis of particular forms of informal finance. Useful ideas from these 
studies might then be grafted onto formal finance programs so that their design more 








• TUESDAY. OCTOBER 17 
7:00 p.m. 
8:00 p.m. 
Registration, Promenade outside Shenandoah B 
Informal Meeting of Participants, Shenandoah B 
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18 ··All Sessions in Rosslyn A Room 
9:00 a.m. Seminar Objectives •• Dale Adams 
Session No. 1: Informal Finance and Microenter.prises 
Chairman: Antonio Gayoso, (S&T Bureau/ AID) 
Carl Liedholm (Worldwide, Michigan State University) 
Mario Lamberte (Philippines, Institute of Dev. Studies) 
Discussant: Thomas Timberg (Robert R. Nathan Associates) 
10:30 • 11:00 a.m., CotTee Break 
Maria Otero and Jean Downing (Latin America, ACCION) 
Robert Christen (Chile, PROPESA) 
Discussant: James Boomgard (DAI) 
12:30 • 2:00 p.m., Lunch, The Vantage Point, 17th Floor 
Session No. 2: Informal Finance in Asia 
Chairman: Antonio Gayoso, (S&T Bureau/ AID) 
Nimal Fernando (Papua-New Guinea, Inst. App. Soc. & Ee. Res.) 
Tongroj Onchan (Thailand, Kasetsart University) 
Discussant: Gershon Feder (World Bank) 
3:30 • 4:00 p.m., CotTee Break 
Nimal Sanderatne (Sri Lanka, Institute of Policy Studies) 
Richard Meyer (Philippines, Ohio State University) 
Discussant: Piedad Geron (NEDA, Philippines) 
THURSDAY,OCTQBER19 
9:00 a.m. - Session No. 3, Informal Finance in Asia (cont,) 
Chairman: Alan Gelb (World Bank) 
Hans Seibel (Indonesia, G1Z) 
Otto Hospes (Indonesia, Wageningen University) 
Discussant: Marguerite Berger (American University) 
10:30 • 11:00 a.m., CotTee Break 
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Session No. 3 Cont. 
Yoichi Izumida (Japan, Utsunomiya University) 
Dibyo Prabowo (Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada) 
Discussant: Clifton Barton (IMCC/ AID) 
12:00 • 2:00 p.m., Lunch, Westpark Cafe 
Speaker: Hernando de Soto (Peru) 
Chairman: Mike Caughlin (Africa Bureau/ AID) 
Session No. 4: Informal Finance in Africa 
Chairman: Sidney Chernick (World Bank) 
Carlos Cuevas (Cameroon, The Ohio State University) 
Virginia DeLancey (Somolia, American University in Cairo) 
Discussant: Sonia Hammam (AID) 
3:30 • 4:00 p.m., Cotree Break 
Ruvimbo Chimedza (Zimbabwe, University of Zimbabwe) 
Parker Shipton (West Africa, On Leave from HIID) 
Discussant: Robert Flammang (Louisiana State University) 
FRIDAY. OCTQBER 20 
9:00 a.m. - Session No. S, Informal Finance in Africa (cont.) 
Chairman: Richard Meyer (Ohio State University) 
Douglas Graham (Niger, Ohio State University) 
Robert Vogel (Latin America, IMCC)* 
Discussant: Rachael Meghir (OECD) 
10:30 • 11:00 a.m., ColTee Break 
C.P.S. Nayar (India Overview) 
U Tun Wai (Overview, IMF Retired) 
12:00 • 1:30 p.m., Lunch·· On Your Own 
Session No. 6, Research and Policy Implications 
Chairman: Richard Meyer (Ohio State University) 
An Agenda for Future Research on Informal Finance 
-P.B Ghate (ADB) 
Panel Discussion: Relevance of Informal Finance 
for Donor Interventions 
Chairman: J.D. Von Pischke (World Bank) 
Panel Members: Jacob Yaron (World Banlc), Beth Rhyne (USAID), 
Erhard Kropp (G1Z), and Hunt Howell (IDB) 
*Also summarized paper by JJ.A Bouman and R. Bastiaanssen on Pawning in SE Asia. 
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